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Encouraging Economic Reform in the
Middle East: Advocating Free Trade with
Egypt
Paul G. Johnson*
INTRODUCTION
There has been a marked proliferation of free trade agree-
ments (FTAs) over the past fifteen years.' Many countries, in-
cluding the United States, now actively promote trade agree-
ments as a prong of their foreign policy, recognizing not only the
economic benefits of such accords but also the potential political
gains.2  This Note will advocate an FTA between the United
States and Egypt. Egypt's political and economic importance to
the United States makes it a ripe target for increased trade.
Additionally, Egypt's expressed desire to increase economic re-
form and gain increased access to the U.S. market makes the
country a seemingly willing partner of such an agreement.4
This Note will first discuss some background information on
J.D. Candidate, 2007, University of Minnesota Law School; M.A., University of
South Dakota, 2003; B.A., University of South Dakota, 2001. Thank you to James
and Carolyn Johnson, Eric Johnson, Jennifer Jorgensen, and Dr. Timothy J. Schorn
for their support and encouragement. Thanks also to my editors, Firooz Basri and
Carl Erik Heiberg, for their advice and guidance.
1. See infra note 19.
2. See infra note 42 and accompanying text.
3. See infra notes 16-17 and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 33-34 and accompanying text.
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the role of the Middle East, and Egypt in particular, in U.S. for-
eign policy. This Note will then provide some additional infor-
mation on Egypt and examine recent trade policy developments
in both Egypt and the United States. Sections II(A) and (B) ex-
amine the potential benefits and concerns for the respective
countries in entering into an FTA. Finally, by way of compari-
son to other U.S. FTAs with countries in the region, Section
II(C) will provide some recommendations on what such an
agreement might include.
I. BACKGROUND ON EGYPT AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY
A. THE ROLE OF THE MIDDLE EAST, AND EGYPT IN PARTICULAR,
IN U.S. FOREIGN POLICY
The Middle East is a region of great political and economic
importance to the United States. In that region, the United
States has a number of strategic interests, ranging from support
for the state of Israel and Israel's peaceful relations with its
Arab neighbors, to the protection of vital petroleum supplies and
the fight against international terrorism.5 The important politi-
cal role that the Middle East plays in U.S. foreign policy is evi-
dent not only from the fact that much of the U.S. foreign assis-
tance budget is spent in the Middle East,' but also from the time
and effort that the United States has expended both in trying to
resolve the conflict between Israelis and Palestinians and fight-
ing the war in Iraq.7
The Middle East was once a center of global trade as coun-
tries in the region controlled commerce on the Mediterranean
Sea.8 However, times have changed as now the Middle East's
5. JEREMY M. SHARP, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., U.S. FOREIGN ASSISTANCE TO
THE MIDDLE EAST: HISTORICAL BACKGROUND, RECENT TRENDS, AND THE FY2006
REQUEST 1 (2005), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL32260.pdf. For
the purposes of the CRS report, the Middle East is geographically considered to be
the area stretching from Morocco to the Persian Gulf, without including Turkey. Id.
at 1 n.1.
6. Joel Singer, The Qualifying Industrial Zone Initiative-A New Tool to Pro-
vide Economic Assistance to Middle Eastern Countries Engaged in the Peace Process,
26 FORDHAM IN'L L.J. 547, 562 (2003). See also infra note 16 and accompanying
text.
7. AHMED GALAL & ROBERT Z. LAWRENCE, ANCHORING REFORM WITH A US-
EGYPT FREE TRADE AGREEMENT 1 (2005) [hereinafter GALAL & LAWRENCE,
ANCHORING REFORM].
8. For example, during the Fatimid Caliphate from A.D. 906 to 1171, Egypt
[Vo1.15:2
ADVOCATING FREE TRADE WITH EGYPT
share of international trade is among the lowest of any area in
the world. 9 The region currently faces many economic hurdles,
including high population growth rates and unemployment, lit-
tle economic growth, and increasing competition from emerging
markets in Eastern Europe, Latin America, and Asia.10 While
oil is a valuable commodity for many countries in the Middle
East and accounts for nearly seventy percent of the region's ex-
ports, overall exports have increased at a rate below the global
average.1' In fact, per capita, there are fewer Middle Eastern
exports today than there were even twenty years ago. 12 In 2001,
foreign direct investment in all Muslim countries was roughly
equal to that of Sweden alone.1 3 Despite the bleak economic pic-
ture painted by these figures, the Middle East is rich in valuable
assets, both in human capital and in natural resources. How-
ever, the human capital can also be a liability since unemploy-
ment is a problem throughout the region; most Middle Eastern
countries have an unemployment rate of over ten percent, which
controlled trade throughout the eastern Mediterranean and developed close ties with
European states, which made Alexandria a harbor of worldwide importance.
COLUMBIA INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS ONLINE ATLAS, EGYPT (1990),
http://www.ciaonet.org/atlas/countries/eg-data loc.html. In fact, the Koran takes a
pro-trade stand, stating "[but let there be amongst you Traffic and trade by mutual
good-will." Koran 004.029 (Yusuf Ali trans.).
9. E.g., Robert B. Zoellick, United States Trade Representative, Address at
the World Economic Forum: Global Trade and the Middle East (June 23, 2003)
(transcript available at http://usinfo.state.gov/mena/Archive/2004/Feb/04-
446610.html) [hereinafter Zoellick Address]. In fact, when one discounts oil and
farm products, the United States imports nearly twice as much from Hong Kong
alone than it does from the twenty-two Arab League member countries collectively.
Id.
10. See Ahmed Galal & Bernard Hoekman, Between Hope and Reality: An
Overview of Arab Economic Integration, in ARAB ECONOMIC INTEGRATION: BETWEEN
HOPE AND REALITY 1-12 (Ahmed Galal & Bernard Hoekman eds., 2003) (explaining
why, despite fifty years of repeated attempts, Arab economic integration has been
very modest, and drawing on the success of the European Union to assess the scope
of Arab economic integration as an instrument for narrowing the persistent gap be-
tween the region's economic potential and its performance).
11. Zoellick Address, supra note 9 ("Exports from the region--over seventy per-
cent of which are accounted for by oil and oil-related products--grew at one and a
half percent per year over the same period, far below a global average growth rate of
six percent.").
12. Id. ("On a per capita basis, exports are significantly lower today than
twenty years ago.").
13. EDWARD GRESSER, PROGRESSIVE POLY INST., BLANK SPOT ON THE MAP:
How TRADE POLICY IS WORKING AGAINST THE WAR ON TERROR 2 (2003),
http://www.ppionline.org/documents/Musliml'rade-0203.pdf (citing UN Conference
on Trade and Development, World Investment Report 2002,
http://ro.unctad.org/wir/).
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is on the high end for developed countries. 4
According to then-U.S. Trade Representative Robert B. Zo-
ellick, currently serving as the Deputy Secretary of State, the
United States has made a "long-term commitment" to assist the
Middle East. 5 Between 1971 and 2001, the United States gave
nearly $145 billion in economic and military assistance to coun-
tries throughout the Middle East.16 Egypt was the second larg-
est recipient of that aid, second only to Israel, as Egypt received
over $52 billion, which calculates to an annual amount of almost
$2 billion.'7 This fiscal year, the request for Egyptian aid is ap-
proximately $1.8 billion. 18 According to the United States
Agency for International Development (USAID), for almost
thirty years, "the United States and Egypt have collaborated
closely in economic development and regional stability."19 A
main focus for the economic aid given to Egypt through the
USAID program, the chief source of economic aid (as opposed to
military aid), is on trade programs to increase Egyptian "open-
ness to international trade." °
B. PROFILE OF EGYPT
Egypt is the most populous Arab country with over seventy-
seven million people, 21 representing nearly a quarter of the
population of the entire Middle East.22 However, close to seven-
teen percent of Egyptians live below the poverty line.23 Textiles
are the largest industry and the leading export after oil products
14. CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, THE WORLD FACTBOOK, EGYPT (2006),
http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/eg.html. In 2005, Egypt had an
estimated workforce of around 21.34 million and an unemployment rate of eleven
percent. Id.
15. Zoellick Address, supra note 9.
16. SHARP, supra note 5, at 7.
17. Id. Israel received almost $79 billion in the same time frame. Id. The an-
nual earmark for Egypt in Congress's appropriations bills have "included a state-
ment that Egypt should undertake further additional economic reforms." Id. at 12.
In amount of aid, Jordan immediately follows Egypt with under $5 billion in aid over
the same thirty-year period. Id.
18. Id. at 13.
19. U.S. Agency for International Development, Asia and the Near East,
http://www.usaid.gov/locations/asia-neareast/countries/egyptegypt.html (last vis-
ited Jan. 28, 2006).
20. Id.
21. CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, supra note 14.
22. Ahmed Galal & Robert Z. Lawrence, Egypt, Morocco, and the United States,
in FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS: US STRATEGIES AND PRIORITIES 301 (Jeffrey J. Schott
ed., 2004) [hereinafter Galal & Lawrence, Egypt].
23. CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, supra note 14.
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and cotton.24 Egypt is the world's sixty-sixth largest exporter,
just ahead of Iraq, exporting approximately $11 billion in goods
annually, while it imports over $19 billion annually.25 The
United States is Egypt's second largest exporting partner, and
Egypt imports more goods from the United States than from any
other country.26 Although Egypt will remain a large recipient of
aid, the United States does plan to reduce its economic assis-
tance to the country, replacing the aid with a mutually-
beneficial trade relationship.27
In a region often noted for political instability, the govern-
ment of Egypt has remained relatively unchanged for a re-
markably long time span. Egypt's President, Mohammed Hosni
Mubarak, has been in power since 1981.28 His presidency wit-
nessed a period of economic and trade reform in the early to mid
1990s. 29 In fact, from 1991 to 1998, Egypt implemented several
structural reforms, including multilateral trade liberalization,
privatization of banks, and deregulation of utilities, as well as
several institutional reforms by modernizing customs admini-
stration, tax administration, and conflict resolution mecha-
nisms.30
That period was followed by a lag which saw little progress,
and Egypt regressed back to less liberal trade policies. 31 How-
ever, in July 2004, a new cabinet was appointed, including sev-
eral advocates of reform.32 According to Egyptian Prime Minis-
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. See CURT TARNOFF & LARRY NOWELS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., FOREIGN
AID: AN INTRODUCTORY OVERVIEW OF U.S. PROGRAMS AND POLICY 6 (noting a ten
year plan to reduce aid to Israel and Egypt); GALAL & LAWRENCE, ANCHORING
REFORM, supra note 7, at 5 (noting that budgetary pressures have encouraged the
United States to pursue ways of decreasing aid to Egypt).
28. CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, supra note 14.
29. See generally Amal Refaat, Egypt: An Assessment of Recent Trade Policy
Developments, in TRADE POLICY DEVELOPMENTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH
AFRICA 113 (Bernard Hoekman & Hanaa Kheir-El-Din eds., 2000) (discussing the
developments in Egyptian trade policy in the 1990s).
30. GALAL & LAWRENCE, ANCHORING REFORM, supra note 7, at 5.
31. See generally Mustapha Al-Sayyid, International and Regional Environ-
ments and State Transformation in Some Arab Countries, in THE STATE AND GLOBAL
CHANGE: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF TRANSITION IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH
AFRICA 156 (Hassan Hakimian & Ziba Moshaver eds., 2001) (discussing the progress
and regression in Egyptian trade).
32. GALAL & LAWRENCE, ANCHORING REFORM, supra note 7, at 5. New reform-
ers include Minister of Industry and Trade Rashid Mohamed Rashid, who was edu-
cated in the United States and was a member of the American Egyptian President's
Council, and Mahmoud Mohieddin, Minister of Investment Development, an econo-
2006]
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ter Ahmed Nazif, the new Egyptian Cabinet "has a specific
mandate to accelerate economic, social, and political reforms."33
President Mubarak himself has indicated that economic reform
takes high priority.34 The recent lack of economic reform has
also hindered the growth of foreign direct investment in Egypt.
35
However, in 2004, thanks in part to the momentum of the cabi-
net, Egypt employed several procedures to increase foreign di-
rect investment in the country, including reforming customs and
income and corporate taxes, reducing energy subsidies, and
moving towards further privatization.36
C. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN U.S. FOREIGN AND TRADE POLICY
Like many countries, the United States has put an in-
creased emphasis on creating free trade areas.3 According to
the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative,
Free trade creates higher-paying jobs for American workers, more
choices and lower prices for hardworking families, reduces the cost of
doing business in the global economy, creates new markets and new
opportunities for U.S. products and services, helps cut poverty and
raise incomes through economic growth, and helps to deepen the roots
mist who is a "vocal proponent of greater political freedoms and radical economic
reforms." Shaden Shehab, The Cabinet's New Look, AL-AHRAM WEEKLY ONLINE,
July 15, 2004, http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2004/699/egl.htm.
33. STAFF OF H.R. COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 108TH CONG., REPORT ON
TRADE MISSION TO TUNISIA, JORDAN, OMAN, AND EGYPT 28 (Comm. Print 2005).
34. See Mubarak Discusses Views on Host of Issues; Reform Takes Priority,
ARABIC NEWS.COM, Jan. 21, 2004, http://www.arabicnews.com/ansub/Daily/Day/
040121/2004012127.html. But see Charles Robert Davidson, Reform and Repression
in Mubarak's Egypt, 24 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 75, 93 (2000) (arguing that Muba-
rak's emphasis on reform amounts to little more than lip service).
35. CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, supra note 14. The annual GDP growth in
Egypt from 2001 to 2003 was around two or three percent. Id.
36. Id.
37. See generally Sydney M. Cone, III, The Promotion of Free-Trade Areas
Viewed in Terms of Most-Favored-Nation Treatment and "Imperial Preference," 26
MICH. J. INT'L. L. 563, 563 (2005) (noting that the United States has increasingly
looked to create agreements outside the framework of the World Trade Organization
(WTO)). Article 24 of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) allows a
combination of two or more countries to dismantle all trade barriers among them-
selves. Jagdish Bhagwati, Beyond NAFTA- Clinton's Trading Choices, 91 FOREIGN
POLY 155, 155-56 (1993). The United States is not alone. Trade agreements have
grown at a phenomenal rate, from 50 in 1990 to over 230 today. THE WORLD BANK,
GLOBAL ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES: TRADE, REGIONALISM, AND DEVELOPMENT 28
(2005), available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org(INTGEP2005/Resources/
gep2005.pdf. According to the World Trade Organization, by July 2005, the only
WTO member not party to a regional trade agreement was Mongolia. World Trade
Org., Regionalism: Friends or Rivals, http://www.wto.org/english/thewtoel
whatis-2e/tif elbeyle.htm (last visited Jan. 28, 2006).
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of democracy and stability in parts of the world that have seen too lit-
tle of both. This is an important time to be pursuing those objectives.
38
The United States is currently party to numerous regional
and bilateral FTAs,39 many of which have been negotiated
within the past five years.40  Because of its overall economic
power, the United States has been a sought-after partner for the
creation of FTAs.41 While economic interests have provided the
impetus for America's trading partners to seek agreements with
the United States, political considerations are often the chief
consideration for the United States in deciding with which coun-
tries and regions it will pursue FTAs.42 In 1997, the United
38. Office of the United States Trade Representative, 2004 Trade Policy
Agenda and 2003 Annual Report of the President of the United States on the Trade
Agreements Program (2004), http://www.ustr.gov/Document Library/
ReportsPublications/2004/2004_TradePolicyAgenda/SectionIndex.html (follow
"Overview of the 2004 Agenda" hyperlink).
39. See United States Trade Representative, http://www.ustr.gov (follow "Trade
Agreements" hyperlink) (last visited Jan. 27, 2006) (listing the countries with which
the United States has agreements). Regional FTAs to which the United States is a
party include the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the Central
American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA). Id. The United States has bilateral
FTAs with Australia, Bahrain, Chile, Israel, Jordan, Morocco, and Singapore. Id.
40. Id. Agreements with Australia, Bahrain, and Morocco were all signed in
2004, while agreements with Chile and Singapore were entered into in 2003. Id.
Additionally, the United States is also a party to several bilateral investment trea-
ties. See id. (listing bilateral investment treaties with thirty-nine different coun-
tries, including Egypt).
41. Cone, supra note 37, at 574. The United States is the world's only super-
power, and thus "the ability to sell products into the U.S. market is of enormous
value, and trading rights which confer that ability are correspondingly valuable."
Id. See also C. Fred Bergsten, Preface to FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS: US STRATEGIES
AND PRIORITIES ix (Jeffrey J. Schott ed., Inst. for Int'l Econ. 2004) (noting that many
countries want to initiate free trade discussions with the United States).
42. GALAL & LAWRENCE, ANCHORING REFORM, supra note 7, at 1. The United
States has bilateral agreements in the Middle East with Bahrain, Israel, Jordan,
and Morocco. Id. The 9/11 Commission Report recommends "a comprehensive U.S.
strategy to counter terrorism should include economic policies that encourage devel-
opment, more open societies, and opportunities for people to improve the lives of
their families and to enhance prospects for their children's future." THE NAT'L
COMM. ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE U.S., THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT:
FINAL REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED
STATES 378-79 (Gov't Printing Office 2004), available at
http://www.gpoaccess.gov/911/.
Terrorism is not caused by poverty. Indeed, many terrorists come from
relatively well-off families. Yet when people lose hope, when societies
break down, when countries fragment, the breeding grounds for terrorism
are created. Backward economic policies and repressive political regimes
slip into societies that are without hope, where ambition and passions have
no constructive outlet.
Id. at 378.
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States decided that Egypt was one such country, and U.S. Vice
President Al Gore and Egyptian President Mubarak met to con-
sider a bilateral FTA.4' Those talks did not end in an agree-
ment.44
Not only has the U.S. executive branch become more willing
to use trade agreements to pursue political objectives, but the
U.S. trade environment has also become more favorable for the
potential partners of such agreements. 45 This is largely due to
the fact that in June 2002, President Bush was granted trade
promotion authority. 46 Trade promotion authority, often called
"fast track," is the trade negotiating authority granted by Con-
gress that allows the President to negotiate international trade
agreements, giving Congress ninety legislative days to approve
or reject the agreement without the option of Congressional
amendment.47 Also, the United States has adopted a strategy of
"competitive liberalization."48  The policy of "competitive liber-
alization" involves "stimulating a competition among trading
partners for access to U.S. markets; the inclusion of provisions
in trade agreements not directly related to market access; and a
greater role for foreign and security policy in U.S. trade policy-
making than in the past."4 9 The policy incorporates a network of
FTAs concluded between the United States and numerous coun-
tries.50  Finally, the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks
spurred U.S. interest in increasing the Middle East's level of
economic development.5'
43. Bus. STUDIES & ANALYSIS CTR., THE AMERICAN CHAMBER OF COMMERCE IN
EGYPT, EGYPT AND THE U.S.: A SOLID AND LASTING PARTNERSHIP 21 (2001),
http://www.amcham.org.eg/dk2001/pdffiles/FTA.pdf.
44. For a discussion of why the talks did not yield an FTA between the two
countries, see GALAL & LAWRENCE, ANCHORING REFORM, supra note 7, at 3 (citing
U.S. disappointment at the pace of Egyptian reforms and discontent over a case
Egypt did not support in the WTO). See also BUILDING BRIDGES: AN EGYPT-U.S.
FREE TRADE AGREEMENT (Ahmed Galal & Robert Z. Lawrence eds., 1998) (providing
a general discussion on the talks).
45. GALAL & LAWRENCE, ANCHORING REFORM, supra note 7, at 3.
46. Washington Council on International Trade, Issue Brief: Fast Track Nego-
tiating Authority, http://www.wcit.org/resources/publications/issue-briefs/
ib fast track.htm (last visited Jan. 28, 2006).
47. Id. See also SHARP, supra note 5 (providing a further discussion on the his-
tory of fast track negotiation in the United States).
48. See generally SIMON J. EVENETT, "COMPETITIVE LIBERALIZATION": A
TOURNAMENT THEORY-BASED INTERPRETATION (2005), http://www.nd.edu/-jbergstr/
Evenett%20Sept2005.pdf (discussing the policy of "competitive liberalization").
49. Id. at 1.
50. GALAL & LAWRENCE, ANCHORING REFORM, supra note 7, at 3.
51. Id.
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In a November 6, 2003 speech, President Bush outlined a
new diplomatic strategy for the Middle East with a goal of en-
hancing the global competitiveness of Middle Eastern coun-
52tries. The strategy came to be known as the Middle East Part-
nership Initiative (MEPI), and it is to be funded with $293
million over four fiscal years in addition to the bilateral eco-
nomic assistance already provided to the region.53 Egypt is a
MEPI country.54 Additionally, at a commencement address in
2003, President Bush proposed "the establishment of a U.S.-
Middle East free trade area within a decade."5
D. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN EGYPTIAN TRADE POLICY
Egypt has signed bilateral trade agreements with Iraq, Jor-
dan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Syria, and Tunisia." Egypt also
signed an agreement with the European Union in 2002 that will
remove barriers to trade on all merchandise that is non-
agricultural over a twelve-year span. Egypt was also a driving
force behind the establishment of the Pan Arab Free Trade
Agreement (PAFTA) in 1998, a regional agreement that aims at
eliminating customs duties for goods originating from member
countries."8
In 1999, the United States and Egypt signed a trade and
52. President George W. Bush, Remarks at the 20th Anniversary of the Na-
tional Endowment for Democracy (Nov. 6, 2003), available at
http://www.state/gov/p/neas/rls/rm/26019.htm. One of the initiative's goals is to fur-
ther economic reform by connecting "Arab, U.S., and global private sector busi-
nesses, non-governmental organizations, civil society elements, and governments
together to develop innovative policies and programs that support reform in the re-
gion." CEDPA Field Offices, CEDPA/Egypt, http://www.cedpa.orglegypt/ (follow "Re-
cent News" hyperlink) (last visited Jan. 31, 2006).
53. Middle East Partnership Initiative, Countries, http://mepi.state.gov/
c10128.htm (last visited Jan. 29, 2006).
54. Middle East Partnership Initiative, http://mepi.state.gov/mepi/ (last visited
Jan. 29, 2006). See Middle East Partnership Initiative, Egypt, http:/mepi.state.gov/
c10128.htm (last visited Jan. 29, 2006), for further details on what the MEPI pro-
gram plans to do in Egypt, namely support economic reform and employment growth
by fostering private sector expansion and entrepreneurship.
55. President George W. Bush, Remarks in Commencement Address at the
University of South Carolina (May 9, 2003), available at http://www.state.gov/
p/nea/rls/rm/20497.htm.
56. BUS. STUDIES & ANALYSIS CTR., supra note 43, at 13.
57. Bernard Hoekman & Denise Konan, Economic Implications of a US-Egypt
FTA, in GALAL & LAWRENCE, ANCHORING REFORM, supra note 7, at 43.
58. Id. See also League of Arab States, The Agreement of Arab Free Trade
Area, http://www.arableagueonline.orglarableague/english/details-en.jsp?artlid=
746&level-id=273 (last visited Jan. 29, 2006). PAFTA is also sometimes referred to
as the Greater Arab Free Trade Area (GAFTA).
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investment framework agreement in order to facilitate bilateral
trade and investment issues between the two countries. 59 In
June 2003, the two countries considered launching FTA negotia-
tions, but those talks never happened, largely because Egypt
withdrew its initial support backing the United States in a U.S.-
launched World Trade Organization (WTO) case involving ge-
netically-modified organisms." A trade relationship continued
to move forward, however, and in December 2004, the United
States, Egypt, and Israel signed a trade protocol to establish
three Qualified Industrial Zones in Egypt.6 Subject to some
conditions, items produced as joint ventures between Egyptian
and Israeli companies in these areas can be exported to the
United States without duty and regardless of quotas.62 It is
hoped that this agreement will be especially beneficial for tex-
tiles, Egypt's largest industry, by providing the industry with
improved access to the United States.63 Improved access to the
world's largest market would then help create jobs and lure for-
eign investment. 4
This is especially important considering that the WTO is
about to lift quotas for trade in textiles for member countries,
increasing global competition in the industry.65 In remarks re-
garding the zone, Egyptian Minister for Industry and Foreign
Trade Rachid Mohamed Rachid has said: "Economic interests
alone are not linked to this agreement. This agreement is con-
sistent with our efforts, which started a long time ago with the
signing of peace between Israel and Egypt. There is no time to
waste, and we must act now to secure peace and prosperity."
66
59. GALAL & LAWRENCE, ANCHORING REFORM, supra note 7, at 3.
60. Id. Although Egypt had initially agreed to side with the United States as a
co-complainant, it eventually decided to support the European Union. Id. at 6.
61. Guy Harpaz & Rachel Frid, Israel: Qualified Industrial Zones-Economic
Protocol Signed by the United States, Egypt and Israel Establishing Three Qualified
Industrial Zones in Egypt, INT'L TRADE L. REG., Mar. 2005, at N9.
62. Id.
63. Id. at N10.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. Egypt and Israel signed a historic peace agreement in 1979. Id. at N9.
Recently, political relations seem to have strengthened between Egypt and Israel,
likely in large part because Egypt would like to play more of a role in the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict. Id. at N10. See also Singer, supra note 6, at 560.
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II. THE OUTLOOK FOR FREE TRADE WITH EGYPT
A. CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES
1. Potential Agreement Benefits for the United States
Former U.S. Trade Representative Robert B. Zoellick has
written that "[t]hrough free-trade agreements... we can em-
brace reforming states, encouraging their transformation and
bolstering their chances for success even as we open new mar-
kets for American goods and services."6' He continued, noting
that the United States has an "immense" strategic interest in
the outcome of the struggle in the Middle East between reform-
ers and those in power.68 Similarly, Representative Bill Thomas
(R-CA), Chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee,
has stated that "trade brings countries together." 9 Chairman
Thomas has emphasized that "the United States remains com-
mitted to multinational trade liberalization through the WTO,
but because each WTO member country is entitled to a veto, the
process is slow, so the United States is also seeking bilateral
and regional trade agreements in the meantime with countries
that are ready."7 °
United States trade policy currently focuses on establishing
67. Robert B. Zoellick, Editorial, When Trade Leads to Tolerance, N.Y. TIMES,
June 12, 2004, at A13. Zoellick went on to say, "[pliece by piece, the [Bush] admini-
stration is building a mosaic of modernizers with a plan that offers trade and open-
ness as tools for Muslim leaders looking toward the rebirth of an optimistic and tol-
erant Islam." Id.
68. Id.
69. STAFF OF H.R. COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 108TH CONG., supra note 33, at
27.
70. Id. at 28. Chairman Thomas also emphasized that uniformity is an impor-
tant element in such agreements, especially in the areas of "financial services,
transparency, and agriculture non-tariff barriers to trade, because exceptions in
these areas make it difficult to conclude an agreement." Id. "Also, unequal FTAs
would make it difficult to integrate various FTAs in the region in the future to cre-
ate larger regional and ultimately multinational agreements," and in his view such
agreements should eventually be integrated. Id. According to Thelma Askey, who
at the time was the Director of the U.S. Trade and Development Agency, "[mioving
forward with bilaterals is thus a way to say to the GATT members and bureaucrats
that the United States will offer its large market to those who want to accept market
disciplines, but it is willing to leave the foot-draggers behind." Shara Aranoff, Re-
gional Trade Organizations: Strengthening or Weakening Global Trade?, 88 AM.
SOCY INT'L L. PROC. 309, 319 (1994). Note, however, that "[tihe United States
rarely pursues bilateral or regional negotiations without having multilateral objec-
tives clearly in mind." Id. at 321.
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free trade areas with countries across the world.7 Several moti-
vations have been cited for this policy, including "enhancing
goods and services trade; stimulating investment flows; extend-
ing standards on intellectual property rights, labour, and the
environment; and addressing geopolitical concerns."72  This
trade approach can provide several advantages. Trade and
other foreign policies are given more attention and more oppor-
tunity for domestic support when linked to domestic politics.
73
The approach also realizes that boosting foreign countries eco-
nomically can further U.S. political interests, creating stronger
bonds between countries because "political alliances help to en-
courage flows of trade, investment, and people between the
partner countries."74
Most importantly for the United States, the adoption of
FTAs seems to be especially linked to national security consid-
erations. 75 The United States has used FTAs to strategically
further relationships that it believes are key in fighting terror-
ism. 76 This factor seems to have been especially prevalent in the
negotiation of agreements with Middle Eastern countries such
as Israel and Jordan.77 That is not to say that economic con-
cerns play no role for the United States in the development of
FTAs-such pacts help increase the access of U.S. exporters to
foreign markets because they reduce trade barriers. 78 They can
also assist U.S. companies by countering the discriminatory
preferences in other FTAs to which the United States is not a
party.7 9 The Bush administration has also suggested that this
approach to international trade can complement multilateral
trade liberalization by "helping to forge common negotiating po-
sitions with partners, or compensate for slow progress in these
negotiations." °
The political relationship between the United States and
the Muslim and Arab countries of the Middle East has changed
71. See supra notes 37-42 and accompanying text.
72. Alvin Hilaire & Yongzheng Yang, The United States and the New Regional-
ism/Bilateralism, 38 J. OF WORLD TRADE 603, 603 (2004).
73. Jeffrey J. Schott, Assessing US FTA Policy, in FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS:
US STRATEGIES AND PRIORITIES 376 (Jeffrey J. Schott ed., 2004).
74. Id.
75. Hilaire & Yang, supra note 72, at 605.
76. Id. This can explain the United States' desire to conclude a regional FTA in
the Middle East.
77. See infra notes 199-202 and accompanying text.
78. Hilaire & Yang, supra note 72, at 605.
79. Id.
80. Id.
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and deteriorated in many ways in the aftermath of the Septem-
ber 11, 2001 terrorist attacks.8' Many people throughout the
world believe that the United States is targeting the Middle
East solely because of its oil, especially after the war in Iraq.2
Many Middle Easterners also feel that U.S. foreign policy favors
Israel over Palestine. s These beliefs could be an especially sig-
nificant problem when trying to form trade partnerships with
Middle Eastern countries but also show that increasing the
trade relationship with the region could benefit the image and
reputation of the United States.84
On the other hand, many in the United States attribute the
Middle East's dissatisfaction with America to poverty and the
lack of economic progress compared with that of Western na-
tions. 5 Even if such perceptions are without merit, both sides
would benefit by taking steps to improve relations and encour-
age further development in the Middle East. While not a pana-
cea, negotiating an FTA with a powerful country in the region,
like Egypt, could be a positive step in the right direction for the
United States. Egypt is an extremely influential player in the
Middle East, having hosted the Arab League since its inception
in 1945, and often shapes the policies of the entire region, such
as by leading the region in its efforts to resolve the conflict be-
tween the Israelis and the Palestinians. 6 Additionally, pro-
Israeli groups seem to support Egypt's role in the peace process.
The American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) has
noted that Egypt "honors its treaty commitments to Israel."87 In
fact, since AIPAC has expressed concern with growing Islamic
fundamentalism threatening the Mubarak government,8 it fol-
lows that economic development strengthening the state would
81. See Pew Charitable Research Ctr., http://people-press.org/reports/
display.php3?ReportID=165 (last visited Jan. 27, 2006) ("Despite an initial outpour-
ing of public sympathy for America following the September 11, 2001 terrorist at-
tacks, discontent with the United States has grown around the world over the past
two years.").
82. See id. (stating that many thought the United States invaded Iraq for oil).
83. THE PEW RESEARCH CTR. FOR THE PEOPLE & THE PRESS, VIEWS OF A
CHANGING WORLD 5 (2003), http://people-press.orgreports/pdf/185.pdf; see also Galal
& Lawrence, Egypt, supra note 22, at 313.
84. See Galal & Lawrence, Egypt, supra note 22, at 313.
85. See id.
86. Id. at 301.
87. AM. ISRAEL PUB. AFFAIRS COMM., REGIONAL THREATS: PROLIFERATION,
TERRORISM AND EXTREMISM 8, http://www.aipac.org/Regional.PDF (last visited Feb.
3, 2006).
88. Id.
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be welcomed by the organization. Due to Egypt's role in the
Middle East, the country is an excellent point for expanding
America's FTAs in the region and could not be left out of an ul-
timate U.S.-Middle East agreement. 89
For the United States, an FTA with Egypt would "indicate a
willingness to promote the economic dimension and facilitate
development."9 ° The United States would benefit by moving its
relationship with Egypt further away from aid with more of a
focus on trade and from adding an additional economic compo-
nent to the Middle East peace process.91 Such a move is not
without precedent, as facilitating free trade has been viewed as
a method to encourage regional stability since at least the af-
termath of World War 11.92 Economic reform and creating a
tighter relationship among the Middle Eastern states "is now
discussed as vital to bring the region out of the peace process
and into the peace., 98  Also similar to the aftermath of World
War II, an FTA could help the United States further political re-
form in Egypt and the region as it could use a closer trade rela-
tionship to encourage further moves towards true democratiza-
tion.94
89. See David Armstrong, U.S. Pays Back Nations that Supported War, S.F.
CHRON., May 11, 2003, at I-1 (giving the opinion of John Howard, Vice President for
International Policy and Programs for the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, that Egypt
should receive FTA consideration before countries such as Turkey); see also GALAL &
LAWRENCE, ANCHORING REFORM, supra note 7, at 4 (noting that Egypt would "cer-
tainly" have to be part of any regional FTA involving the United States).
90. GALAL & LAWRENCE, ANCHORING REFORM, supra note 7, at 2.
91. Id. "[Tirade agreements have played a role in the Middle East peace proc-
ess." Colin B. Picker, Regional Trade Agreements v. The WTO: A Proposal for Re-
form of Article XXIV to Counter This Institutional Threat, 26 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON.
L. 267, 278 (2005). The U.S.-Jordan FTA was seen largely as a reward for Jordan's
peace agreement with Israel. Mohammad Nsour, Fundamental Facets of the United
States-Jordan Free Trade Agreement, 27 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 742, 742 (2004). See
also supra note 27 and accompanying text.
92. "Additionally, in those post-[WWII] years, [free trade agreement] formation
was encouraged as another mechanism to help increase security in Europe." Picker,
supra note 91, at 274. It is also interesting to note that President Franklin Roose-
velt claimed that economic cooperation and free trade would help avoid another
World War. Picker, supra note 91, at 274 n.19 (citing JAMES H. MATHIS, REGIONAL
TRADE AGREEMENTS IN THE GATT-WTO: ARTICLE XXlV AND THE INTERNAL TRADE
REQUIREMENT 28 (2002)).
93. Jack I. Garvey, Regional Free Trade Dispute Resolution as Means for Secur-
ing the Middle East Peace Process, 47 AM. J. COMP. L. 147, 147 (1999). The author
argues that the principals in the peace negotiations view economic cooperation as
necessary. Id. at 148. "All sides appear to agree that mutual interest in stability
and normalization of relations can be realized through the natural benefits of liber-
alized trade." Id. at 149.
94. See AMR HAMZAWY & NATHAN J. BROWN, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR
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Trade expert Robert Z. Lawrence notes that there are four
broad categories of interests for the United States in an FTA
with Egypt.95 The first is U.S.-Egypt economic relations, includ-
ing providing economic benefits and improving access to Egyp-
tian markets for U.S. companies.96  The second involves Egyp-
tian economic development in light of the fact that Egypt is an
important ally that the United States would like to see develop
for several reasons, not the least of which is to decrease the need
for U.S. aid.97 The third category is regional economic develop-
ment, promoting economic development and peace in the re-
gion.98 Lawrence's final category involves using U.S. trade pol-
icy to lead the way to a more open global system for trade and
investment.99 As previously noted, many believe that it is the
non-economic benefits, likely fitting broadly within Lawrence's
middle two categories, that serve as the primary reasons for the
United States to enter into FTAs. 100
Another expert, Ahmed Galal, believes that an FTA with
Egypt could have four concrete and advantageous effects."1 The
INTERNATIONAL PEACE, CAN EGYPT'S TROUBLED ELECTIONS PRODUCE A MORE
DEMOCRATIC FUTURE? 9 (2005), http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/
P024.brown.hamzawy.FINALl.pdf (noting that a real democracy is most likely to
emerge in the Middle East in a country that truly has political give and take).
95. Robert Z. Lawrence, Toward an Egypt-U.S. Free Trade Agreement, in
BUILDING BRIDGES: AN EGYPT-U.S. FREE TRADE AGREEMENT 67 (Ahmed Galal &
Robert Z. Lawrence eds., 1998). Robert Z. Lawrence is a Professor of International
Trade and Investment at the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard
University and a Senior Fellow at the Institute for International Economics.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. "The United States, Israel, and some Arab countries have recognized
that political and strategic interests can be furthered more effectively through eco-
nomic cooperation and interaction (integration)." Roni N. Halabi, Note, Stability in
the Middle East Through Economic Development, 2 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 275, 294
(1997). FTAs lead to increased stability because they expand trade, encourage pri-
vate investment, encourage export-led growth policies, expand economic growth, and
create jobs. Id. Egypt's protected economy does not allow foreign investors to play
much of a role in the country, and therefore participating in the Egyptian market is
difficult for American investors. Lawrence, supra note 95, at 37. United States gov-
ernmental reports have identified many impediments to trading with Egypt, includ-
ing "official policies such as import licensing, high tariffs, time-consuming and ex-
pensive customs and quality control procedures, and unofficial practices that in
some cases reflected corruption." Id.
100. See THE WORLD BANK, supra note 37, at 35-40 (discussing non-economic
benefits of FTAs); Picker, supra note 91, at 278 ("In particular, foreign policy and
national security continue to be significant reasons for entering into RTAs."); see
also supra notes 74-75 and accompanying discussion.
101. GALAL & LAWRENCE, ANCHORING REFORM, supra note 7, at 10. Ahmed
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first is a demonstrative effect--given Egypt's role as a regional
leader and the tendency of its neighbors to emulate it, "[b]y vir-
tue of Egypt's size, location, and cultural and political leader-
ship in the region, successful reform there could have a positive
demonstrative effect throughout the Middle East."1 °2 The second
is a reform-boosting effect because the reform process in Egypt
"has been steady but incremental," and remains incomplete.'
Galal asserts that this is because political feasibility and social
concerns have been important factors throughout the Egyptian
reform process, and that when reforms picked up speed in the
early 1990s, they were anchored by commitments Egypt had
made to the international community. 04 This suggests that ex-
ternal agreements, such as a U.S.-Egypt FTA, may hasten the
reform process.
The third effect is a diversion avoidance effect. Because
Egypt has entered into a number of FTAs with the European
Union and other parties, a U.S.-Egypt FTA "would prevent US
exporters and investors from being at a disadvantage in the
Egyptian market, especially compared with the European Un-
ion." 1°' Galal's fourth effect is the sustainability of bilateral eco-
nomic relations between the two countries, because the relation-
ship currently depends heavily on U.S. aid to Egypt. 10 7  By
moving the relationship more towards trade and away from aid,
the United States might be seen less as helping Egypt for purely
political reasons, instead moving the relationship forward to in-
volve more economic cooperation than dependence. In fact,
helping Egypt become stronger economically will only make the
country a more capable and valuable ally to have in the region.
Finally, if the United States wants to see free trade in the Mid-
dle East,0 8 it must continue pressing forward with bilateral
agreements or risk the entire policy falling apart. Concluding
Galal is executive director and director of research at the Egyptian Center for Eco-
nomic Studies (ECES) in Cairo and a staff member of the World Bank.
102. Id. Culturally, Egypt produces many of the Arabic language books, music,
and movies, and politically has hosted the Arab League since inception and led mili-
tary and diplomatic efforts to resolve Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Id.
103. Id. at 11.
104. Id. Egypt had promised to increase reform efforts because of agreements
with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. Id.
105. Id. at 11.
106. Id. at 16. Egypt's trade agreement with the European Union will eliminate
tariffs on EU exports within twelve years, and "[w]ithout a similar agreement with
the United States, US exports will be seriously penalized." Id.
107. Id. at 10.
108. See supra notes 52-55 and accompanying discussion.
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an FTA with Egypt will not only help the United States main-
tain a strong relationship with the country, but will also en-
courage other countries in the region to follow Egypt's lead and
negotiate similar agreements with the United States.
2. Potential Concerns for the United States
Opponents of FTAs often cite potential environmental deg-
radation, focus on the costs to American labor, or are concerned
about labor in the foreign countries.0 9 Deputy Secretary of
State Zoellick, however, believes that these arguments are "self-
defeating" because agreements entered into by the United
States "require our partners to enforce their labor and environ-
mental laws and strive to upgrade their standards.""0 He be-
lieves that FTAs are "a powerful way to strengthen openness
and democracy, counter poverty, encourage tolerance and pro-
mote better working conditions.""1 While there is a fear that in-
creased trade leading to further economic activity will degrade
the environment, trade is not necessarily linked to things like
pollution and it is important to note that most environmental
groups do support FTAs that have environmental protections
built into the agreements. 
112
Some argue that trade liberalization on a multilateral basis
through the WTO is preferable to regional and bilateral agree-
ments because multilateral agreements are better at avoiding
trade diversion and complications can arise with the creation of
many agreements that must overlap."' Additionally, overlap-
109. Zoellick, supra note 67, at A13. As an example of how labor can impact
such agreements, the U.S. textile industry is a powerful lobby that is concerned
about preserving barriers to imports and has opposed agreements that have allowed
for more free importation of textiles into the United States. See Dan Ikenson, Cen-
ter for Trade Policy Studies, Threadbare Excuses: the Textile Industry's Campaign to
Preserve Import Restraints, Oct. 15, 2003, http://www.freetrade.org/pubs/pas/tpa-
025es.html.
110. Zoellick, supra note 67, at A13. As evidence, Zoellick cites labor reforms in
countries that have entered FTAs with the United States, such as Morocco. Id.
111. Id. Zoellick argues that free-trade agreements help to integrate economic
reforms "with the struggle for democracy and tolerance that is vital to our security."
Id.
112. See generally DOUGLAS A. IRWIN, FREE TRADE UNDER FIRE 48-54 (2002)
(discussing free trade and environmental concerns).
113. Picker, supra note 91, at 270. See also Free Trade Deals: Is the United
States Losing Ground As Its Trading Partners Move Ahead?: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Trade of the Comm. on Ways & Means, 107th Cong. 9 (2001) (testi-
mony of Jeffrey J. Schott, Senior Fellow, Institute for International Economics),
available at http://www.iie.com/publications/papers/paper.cfm?ResearchID=405.
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ping agreements pose a threat to the WTO, and therefore
"[dlespite the specific benefits of individual [regional trade
agreements], when taken as a whole, they tend to undermine
the development of the multilateral trade system.""4 This line
of thought concludes that the establishment of trade agreements
outside the WTO structure has slowed progress in the WTO and
has hurt free trade.
115
However, regional agreements can play an important role in
trade liberalization, especially when moving away from pure
economic analysis and factoring in political concerns." 6 There
are several factors that impact the effectiveness of such regional
agreements. Regional agreements are most likely to offer the
greatest benefits and create the least diversion if they are com-
prehensive and cover a diverse regional area."7 The emphasis
should be on assisting countries to achieve shared economic and
trade objectives, not using threats to force an agreement that is
more advantageous for the stronger trading partner."8 Regional
agreements may play "an important role in helping lock in
broader reform agendas among participating countries." 19 Ad-
ditionally, some have argued that incremental trade liberaliza-
tion is a better route for Middle Eastern countries because it
helps to avoid political instability.120 However, this is less of a
problem for this proposed agreement because the government of
Egypt is stable compared to other regimes in the region.
121
Another concern for a potential U.S.-Egypt trade agreement
is that FTA talks between the two countries have already bro-
ken down once. Two reasons have been given for the break-
down of the FTA negotiations. The first reason is the slowed
pace of Egypt's economic reform process after 1998.123 This re-
114. Picker, supra note 91, at 270. But see Aranoff, supra note 70, at 310 (argu-
ing that regionalism has been prevalent in the world for a long time, with the big
difference being that the United States changed its position in the 1980s with re-
spect to regionalism, resulting in the zeal for new regional initiatives).
115. Picker, supra note 91, at 318.
116. Id.
117. Hilaire & Yang, supra note 72, at 610.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. See generally Raymond Hinnebusch, The Politics of Economic Liberaliza-
tion: Comparing Egypt and Syria, in THE STATE AND GLOBAL CHANGE: THE
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF TRANSITION IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA 111
(Hassan Hakimian & Ziba Moshaver eds., 2001).
121. See supra note 28 and accompanying discussion.
122. See supra notes 43-44 and accompanying discussion.
123. GALAL & LAWRENCE, ANCHORING REFORM, supra note 7, at 5. From 1991 to
1998, Egypt undertook several economic reforms, including multilateral trade liber-
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duced pace has raised doubts for some about whether Egypt can
meet the standards America demands in a strong trading part-
ner."' The second reason is that the United States did not trust
Egypt after the country decided not to back the United States in
the WTO case involving genetically-modified organisms.
However, a trade agreement could not only hasten Egyptian re-
form, but could bring the two countries together in a way to
make such WTO disagreements less likely.'
A general concern for free trade opponents is the fact that,
by their very nature, FTAs discriminate against other countries
not party to the pact. Since it is an agreement between a set
number of countries, other countries must be excluded.'27 To
overcome this inherent discrimination, countries must con-
stantly seek new partners with which to join FTAs. For exam-
ple, the U.S.-Israel FTA contributed to the need and desirability
for an agreement with Jordan. 28 There are also concerns that
such agreements can undermine sovereignty by restricting
partner countries' ability to make decisions 129 This is a political
reality of all treaties, however, and a necessary facet of being a
leading member of an increasingly global community and econ-
omy. It is certainly true that there is only so much political and
economic integration the United States is willing to accept.
130
Additionally, if an FTA spanning the entire Middle East is
• 131
truly a goal of the United States, former Egyptian Minister of
Foreign Trade, Dr. Youssef Boutros Ghali, believes "the only
way to attract other large countries in the region such as Saudi
alization, bank privatization, and utilities deregulation, in addition to reforms to
reduce transaction costs by reworking certain areas of customs, taxes, and conflict
resolution mechanisms. Id.
124. Id.
125. See supra note 60 and accompanying discussion.
126. See supra note 67 and accompanying discussion.
127. Howard Rosen, Free Trade Agreements as Foreign Policy Tools: The US-
Israel and US-Jordan FTAs, in FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS: US STRATEGIES AND
PRIORITIES 301 (Jeffrey J. Schott ed., 2004).
128. Id. at 74-75.
129. Aranoff, supra note 70, at 309. Charles Roh was a member of the U.S.
Trade Representative's Office and deputy chief negotiator of NAFTA. Mr. Roh also
notes that, "[olne of the reasons the United States refrained for many years from
free trade agreements was a concern that it made us look as though we were choos-
ing from among our best friends who would be our most best friend." Id.
130. Id. at 321 (noting that the United States would never subject itself to an
agreement as encompassing as the European Union because EU member countries
are more integrated than the United States is willing to become with another coun-
try).
131. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
2006]
MINNESOTA JOURNAL OF INT'L LAW
Arabia is to conclude an FTA with Egypt."132 He contends that
other countries, such as Jordan and Morocco, with which the
United States has concluded agreements, are too small to be sig-
nificant.3 3  Additionally, given Egypt's significance in the re-
gion, it would not only be a catalyst for other countries to join
similar agreements but would be a necessary player in the even-
tual success of any regional agreement.' There are also con-
cerns that a bilateral agreement could hurt other countries in
the Middle East if it is not eventually converted into a larger re-
gional FTA that incorporates other countries throughout the re-
gion.
135
A final area of concern for the United States involves hu-
man rights. There are several human rights concerns that have
been cited in Egypt, such as torture, restrictions on the free-
doms of association and religion, ill-treatment of homeless chil-
dren, and women's rights. 36  However, such abuses are not
unique to Egypt as opposed to other Middle Eastern trading
partners, such as Jordan. 37 Even in Egypt, the United States
has been willing to look past such abuses when it has served its
foreign policy purposes, such as using the country to interrogate
prisoners suspected of terrorism.3 8 While there are certainly se-
rious concerns regarding Egypt's treatment of its citizens, the
best way for reform may be through economic agreements and
132. STAFF OF H.R. COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 108TH CONG., supra note 33, at
27.
133. Id. Such countries include Jordan, Bahrain, and Morocco.
134. See supra notes 86-89 and accompanying discussion.
135. Aranoff, supra note 70, at 312. Amelia Porges, then the GATT Secretariat's
Senior Legal Advisor, argues that liberalization for those in the bloc can take place
at the expense of third parties who are not at the regional bargaining table. Id.
136. See Human Rights Watch Country Overview, World Report 2005,
http://hrw.org/english/docs/2005/01/13/egypt9802.htm (providing an overview of the
organization's human rights concerns in Egypt); Egyptian Counterterrorism and Po-
litical Reform Act, H.R. 1670, 109th Cong. (2005) (finding regular victimization of
the Coptic Christian minority group in Egypt in addition to regular use of torture by
the government).
137. Compare Human Rights Watch Country Overview, supra note 136 (noting
human rights concerns with Egypt), with Letter from Human Rights Watch to the
Prime Minister of Jordan (Aug. 1, 2005), http://hrw.org/doc/?t=mideast&c=jordan
(last visited Dec. 27, 2005) (noting human rights concerns with Jordan).
138. Egypt appears to be the most frequently-used receiving country for U.S.
'extraordinary renditions," in which foreign nationals suspected of plotting terrorist
attacks are transported to a third country where they can be interrogated without
restrictions that the United States would otherwise impose were it to use its own
agents to interrogate the suspects. See Jane Mayer, Outsourcing Torture: The Secret
History of America's "Extraordinary Rendition" Program, NEW YORKER, Feb. 14,
2005, at 106.
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modernization.' An FTA with Egypt could help the United
States influence Egypt's human rights record in a positive way
by fostering economic reform and encouraging further democra-
tization in the country.
B. CONSIDERATIONS FOR EGYPT
1. Potential Benefits for Egypt
Increased FTAs between the United States and countries in
the Middle East "can help Middle Eastern governments imple-
ment export-led growth policies [which] help attract private in-
vestment, thereby increasing economic growth and creating
badly needed jobs, which promotes more stability in the re-
gion."i4 Because FTAs are not designed to promote harmoniza-
tion, the agreements are excellent for helping countries eco-
nomically while not compromising political independence by
requiring further synchronization.' This would be an advan-
tage to Middle Eastern countries that want to sell more than oil
to the United States and need economic growth but do not want
to be seen as moving too close to the United States politically.
4 1
For Egypt, an FTA with the United States "could spur
measures to further liberalize the domestic economy and inte-
grat[ion] into the world economy."4 3 Although global trade has
grown rapidly over the last twenty-five years, Egypt's share of
world exports has dropped from .15% in 1980 to .07% in 2000.'4
139. "Just as religious freedom offers the best hope for Christian social influ-
ence, economic freedom is the best hope for spreading that influence around the
world." Robert A. Sirico, Editorial, China and the Trade Warriors, WALL ST. J.,
June 11, 1997, at A22.
140. Halabi, supra note 99, at 294. Note also that the World Bank sees a poten-
tial FTA encompassing the entire Middle East as "a catalyst for positive change,"
forcing economic change and diversification in the region away from the concentra-
tion on oil and promoting exports. World Bank, Expanded Trade and Investment
Holds Promise for Millions of Jobs in the Middle East,
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/NEWS/0,,contentMDK:20117024-m
enuPK:34463-pagePK34370-piPK:34424-theSitePK:4607,00.html (last visited Jan.
28, 2006). Such a view would also hold for Egypt in a bilateral agreement.
141. Halabi, supra note 99, at 294.
142. Id.
143. GALAL & LAWRENCE, ANCHORING REFORM, supra note 7, at 2. "In
1991 ... economic reform in Egypt began in earnest with the signing of an Interna-
tional Monetary Fund agreement and Paris Club forgiveness of 50 percent of Egypt's
official debt obligations." Lawrence, supra note 95, at 38. Between 1991 and 1996,
Egypt was able to lower its budget deficit and reduce inflation. Id.
144. FEMISE COORDINATORS, EGYPT COUNTRY PROFILE: THE ROAD AHEAD FOR
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Largely because of high tariffs averaging over thirty percent,
Egypt "remains one of the most restrictive countries [for trade]
in the region."1
One reason that Egypt's economy has not developed as rap-
idly as other countries in other regions is because other regions
as a whole have often seen times of collective increased devel-
opment."' "While Egypt and other developing countries in the
Middle East were still debating whether to adopt reforms, many
emerging economies in other parts of the world were on the
move."4 7 The globalization of economies has "encouraged new
alliances between developed and developing countries, sharp-
ened the competition for foreign investment, and placed a high
premium on outward-oriented policies." 8  While there were
concerns that groups of isolated trading partners would inhibit
global trade, "[mlarket forces now discipline discriminatory
trade practices far more quickly and effectively than in the past;
and government policies that raise the cost of doing business by
imposing excessive trade, tax, or regulatory burdens often find
their companies retrenching and investors relocating else-
where."" 9 In general, bilateral or regional FTAs are easier to
conclude than agreements through the WTO, because they re-
quire agreement among a smaller number of countries. There-
fore, Egypt is more likely to see immediate benefit from a bilat-
eral agreement than if it waits for the WTO to act.
150
States often join trade agreements to ensure continued ac-
cess to a market already covered by an existing agreement.'5'
For example, the purpose of Canada's involvement in NAFTA
was partially to ensure it retained the access to the U.S. market
that it had obtained from a previous bilateral agreement.' Al-
though Egypt does already have the Qualified Industrial Zone
agreement with the United States, it is not broad enough to
EGYPT 85 (2004), available at httpJ/www.erf.org.eglhtml/Country-Profile.asp#
EgyptCountryProfile (follow "Chapter 3: Trade Issues" hyperlink).
145. Id. at 99.
146. Lawrence, supra note 95, at 38.
147. Id. Global investors have not generally focused on the Middle East, choos-
ing instead to invest in nations in Asia, Latin America, and Eastern Europe that
have reformed their economies in ways that invited foreign capital. Id.
148. Jeffrey J. Schott, Free Trade Agreements: Boon or Bane of the World Trad-
ing System?, in FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS: US STRATEGIES AND PRIORITIES 3, 6 (Jef-
frey J. Schott ed., 2004) [hereinafter Schott, Free Trade].
149. Id.
150. Id. at 12. See also supra note 70 and accompanying discussion.
151. Picker, supra note 91, at 274-75.
152. Id.
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cover the amount of trade needed to spur reform in the coun-
try.1 3 Egypt needs to move forward with a deeper agreement
with the United States to maintain and broaden access to the
U.S. market. Similarly, when all other countries are perceived
to be entering into such arrangements, a country will not want
to be left behind and will seek to enter agreements itself."' Like
the United States, Egypt could also benefit by offsetting some of
the trade diversion effects of other trade agreements.' An FTA
with the United States would help Egypt overcome agreements
to which it does not belong, including agreements the United
States already has in the region, and would also help the coun-
try compete against Asian textiles in the U.S. market.
A U.S.-Egypt agreement could also have an important lock-
in effect on Egyptian domestic reform because "policy reversals
become more costly because changes that violate the free trade
obligations could trigger retaliation by trading partners."'56
Such agreements could help Egypt withstand protectionist de-
mands of domestic politics and better resist pressure to take ac-
tions that might be popular domestically but harmful economi-
cally.'57 By promoting consistency within Egypt's trade policies,
an FTA could help facilitate planning and foster investment.
In this way, an FTA with an economically powerful partner can
"serve as an economic building block for the betterment of small
economies," forcing them to adopt and stick with more transpar-
ent domestic and international policies 9  This is especially im-
portant for Egypt because, as previously noted, the Egyptian
economy is still in a state of transition, with a long list of areas
in need of reform. Egyptian Prime Minister Ahmed Nazif has
said that Egypt is a strong ally of the United States and the
country "needs reassurance" that the United States is backing
Egypt's reform program. 6' Many reforms are related to FTAs,
including the liberalization of trade and services, reforming cus-
toms, further privatization, adoption of antitrust policies, labor
153. See supra notes 61-65 and accompanying discussion.
154. Picker, supra note 91, at 275. This is known as "domino regionalism." Id.
155. See infra notes 202-08 and accompanying discussion.
156. Schott, Free Trade, supra note 148, at 13.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Manaspas Xuto, Concluding Notes, in BRAINSTORMING ON CONVERGENCE
OF PREFERENTIAL TRADING ARRANGEMENTS AND THE MULTILATERAL TRADING
SYSTEM: DISCUSSION PAPERS AND SELECTED NOTES 35 (Nilaratna Xuto ed., 2004),
available at http'//www.itd.chula.ac.th/FTA%20Brainstorming%202004.pdf.
160. STAFF OF H.R. COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 108TH CONG., REPORT ON
TRADE MISSION TO TUNISIA, JORDAN, OMAN, AND EGYPT 28 (Comm. Print 2005).
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reforms, and additional measures to attract foreign direct in-
vestment.16' There is also a general need in Egypt to improve
governance by "increasing transparency, reducing red tape and
transactions costs, and improving conflict resolution mecha-
nisms. " 162 An FTA with the United States would increase trans-
parency and reduce bureaucratic layers by implementing and
requiring certain procedures. Conflict resolution mechanisms
are also a common feature of FTAs.
For Egypt, a driving force behind a potential agreement
with the United States is to help attract foreign investment.
163
Egypt could use an FTA with the United States to give credibil-
ity to its promises of reform, using such credibility to attract
foreign direct investment.' This would be analogous to a bene-
fit Mexico received from signing NAFTA with the United States
and Canada.1
65
Egypt has joined other bilateral and regional FTAs, includ-
ing a loose system with other Middle Eastern countries. How-
ever, although the Middle East was one of the first regions to
consider a regional trade system, such a system in the region
remains woefully incomplete. 67 Similarly, it can be argued that
after concluding an FTA with the European Union, 68 Egypt has
undertaken the necessary reforms to gain the confidence of for-
eign investors. 69 However, the agreement with the European
Union will not serve as a credible reform anchor because it is
not comprehensive. 70 Likewise, the Qualified Industrial Zone
agreement signed in December 2004 with Israel is a good step,
but it is restrictive. 7' Because it operates in isolation, it is not
likely to spur reform in the same meaningful way that an FTA
with a large market like the United States could.'71 For Egypt,
an FTA with the United States could support unfinished domes-
161. GALAL & LAWRENCE, ANCHORING REFORM, supra note 7, at 25.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 27.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. See supra notes 56-58 and accompanying discussion.
167. Samiha Fawzy, The Economics and Politics of Arab Economic Integration,
in ARAB ECONOMIC INTEGRATION: BETWEEN HOPE AND REALITY 13 (Ahmed Galal &
Bernard Hoekman eds., 2003).
168. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
169. GALAL & LAWRENCE, ANCHORING REFORM, supra note 7, at 27-28.
170. Id. For example, the agreement does not require the liberalization of ser-
vices. Id.
171. See supra notes 61-66 and accompanying discussion.
172. GALAL & LAWRENCE, ANCHORING REFORM, supra note 7, at 5.
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tic reforms, increase access to U.S. markets, and encourage in-
creased foreign investment.' 3 It could also strengthen the eco-
nomic relationship between the two countries by moving more
towards a partnership and away from pure economic aid.'74
Egypt has recognized that it needs further domestic economic
reform, and its leaders appear ready to embrace freer trade with
the United States . 75 Although it has made efforts, the country
has been frustrated by a lack of real reform76 and must make an
effort to lock in reform. An FTA with the United States could
not only spur additional reforms but also help assure that the
reforms remain in place.
2. Potential Concerns for Egypt
During the previous FTA discussions between Egypt and
the United States, Egypt was concerned that the United States
might require reforms that would be difficult for Egypt in areas
like labor and environmental standards. 7  Egyptians were also
concerned that the United States could use the negotiations,
and eventually the FTA, to pressure Egypt on political issues
outside the reach of the FTA.'17  This is not far-fetched, consider-
ing that the United States previously ended FTA discussions
over a dispute within the WTO. " 9 Additionally, although many
Egyptian citizens believe that global trade is a positive influence
in their local economy,' other political groups outside the gov-
173. Id. at 23-24.
174. Id. at 24.
175. See supra notes 33-34, 66 and accompanying discussion.
176. See supra notes 28-30 and accompanying discussion.
177. GALAL & LAWRENCE, ANCHORING REFORM, supra note 7, at 2-3.
178. Id. at 6.
On one hand, there are those who focus on the substance of recommended
reforms and believe such reforms, with adjustments, are the kind of re-
forms the region needs. They see the initiative as a potentially useful
mechanism for lending support to the reform process and enabling the re-
gion to catch up with emerging markets. They further believe that effec-
tive measures by the United States toward resolving regional conflicts
would turn the attention of regional politicians toward domestic reforms.
On the other hand, there are others who are more skeptical about US in-
tentions. To them, renewed interest by the United States in the region is
motivated only by the desire to maintain a stable supply of oil and ensure
the security of the state of Israel.
Id. at 9-10.
179. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
180. Sixty-seven percent of Egyptians think global trade is at least "somewhat
good" for their country's economy. THE PEW RESEARCH CTR. FOR THE PEOPLE & THE
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ernment have opposed FTAs, most notably that with the Euro-
pean Union. Also of concern is the fact that most Muslim
populations think that U.S. policies bring less rather than more
stability to the Middle East. 8  An FTA that would allow eco-
nomic cooperation without requiring political unification could
help the U.S. image and would likely be more palatable to Mus-
lim populations, especially considering the large amount of aid
that Egypt already receives.
A key issue for a U.S.-Egypt FTA is the impact it will have
183on domestic institutions. Egypt would have concerns that an
FTA would limit certain options or force certain actions that
may be domestically unpopular.18 Egypt would also be con-
cerned about moving too close to the United States politically.
88
Even moving closer economically could be a concern, as "[firee
trade among countries with very different domestic practices re-
quires either a willingness to countenance the erosion of domes-
tic structures or the acceptance of a certain degree of harmoni-
zation.""8 6 Egypt's leadership appears willing to accept some of
the harmonization that would necessarily accompany a trade
agreement, 8 7 and the acceptance and success of trade agree-
ments by other Middle Eastern countries with the United States
shows that trade can work in the region.
PRESS, VIEWS OF A CHANGING WORLD, supra note 83, at 10. Twenty-five percent of
Egyptians surveyed think global trade is very good for their country, while forty-two
percent think it is at least somewhat good. Id.
181. "I have a lot of reservations over this agreement [with the EU]. It is a big
adventure and its implementation could end up destroying our local industries and
turning Egypt into a market for European goods," said Khaled Mohieddin, leader of
the leftist Tagammu Party. Gamal Essam El-Din & Niveen Wahish, The Task
Ahead, AL-AHRAM WEEKLY ONLINE, April 17, 2003, available at
http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2003/634/ecl.htm. Mounir Fakhri Abdel-Nour, spokes-
man for the liberal Wafd Party, focused on the fact that the agreement does not offer
Egypt significant advantages to raise agricultural exports to Europe, saying "[miost
European countries still insist on offering their farmers huge subsidies amounting to
350 billion euros annually. This is a stumbling block and we must begin new nego-
tiations to raise our quota of agricultural exports to Europe." Id.
182. THE PEW RESEARCH CTR. FOR THE PEOPLE & THE PRESS, VIEWS OF A
CHANGING WORLD, supra note 83, at 6.
183. GALAL & LAWRENCE, ANCHORING REFORM, supra note 7, at 25.
184. Id. "By entering into an FTA with the United States, Egypt could lose con-
trol over some domestic policies and institutions when it agrees to harmonize them
with those of the United States." Id. at 28.
185. See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
186. DANI RODRiK, HAS GLOBALIZATION GONE Too FAR? 37 (1997).
187. See supra notes 33-34 and accompanying discussion.
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C. COMPARISON WITH OTHER U.S. BILATERAL TRADE
AGREEMENTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND A DISCUSSION OF THE
ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF A U.S.-EGYPT AGREEMENT
After committing to negotiations, the fundamental decision
for Egypt and the United States is whether the two countries
desire for the FTA to formalize only trade in goods, some of
which might still be restricted, or to have a more comprehensive
agreement that covers all goods, including agricultural products,
foreign investment, services, and intellectual property, while
also including language restricting domestic regulatory stan-
dards and practices.' This second, more comprehensive type of
agreement can extend liberalization "to many aspects of the do-
mestic economic environment, including the production of goods,
services, and investment, and may involve dictates for policies,
such as environmental standards, labor laws, government pro-
curement, regulations, antitrust legislation, and intellectual
property rights."8 9 This type of agreement would have the po-
tential of having a greater economic impact because it would
deal with a broader range of goods, and would also be more
likely to encourage economic and institutional reforms as some
formal changes would be required by the FTA.
Several agreements could serve as models for a U.S.-Egypt
FTA. One model could be the traditional WTO FTA, exemplified
by the U.S.-Israel FTA, which took effect in 1985.'90 While this
agreement did eliminate duties for Israeli merchandise sent to
the United States, it was nonetheless not a very broad agree-
ment as it allowed the respective countries to continue to protect
agricultural products, contained no binding mechanism to settle
disputes, and did not touch at all upon the issues of foreign in-
vestment or services.191 Another potential model has been
termed by some to be a 'WTO-plus." 192 NAFTA, which entered
into force in 1994, is an example of such a "WTO-plus" agree-
ment and is more consistent with recent U.S. agreements and
trade policies.9 NAFTA is much broader than the U.S.-Israel
188. GALAL & LAWRENCE, ANCHORING REFORM, supra note 7, at 26.
189. Id. "To pursue what I would characterize as 'deep integration' is much eas-
ier at the regional level." Aranoff, supra note 70, at 310.
190. Lawrence, supra note 95, at 72-73.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id. For further information on NAFTA and full text of the agreements, see
North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M.
289 (1993).
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FTA in that it contains provisions regarding the resolution of
disputes and contains side agreements relating to the enforce-
ment of labor and environmental standards.194
The most recent trade agreements the United States has
concluded in the Middle East fit much better along the plane of
NAFTA than with the U.S.-Israel agreement. For example, the
agreement with Jordan deals with a wide range of trade issues.
Within ten years, it will eliminate all barriers to trade between
the two countries in almost all industrial goods and agricultural
products.'95 The recent agreement with Bahrain, signed in 2004,
goes even further than the agreement with Jordan.'96 It deals
specifically with financial services, telecommunications, e-
commerce, intellectual property rights, labor, the environment,
and dispute resolution.' 97 However, in order to quell potential
dissent from the textile lobby at home, the agreement with Bah-
rain contains protection for the U.S. textile industry.9
The FTAs that the United States has signed with both Is-
rael and Jordan are good examples of the United States' use of
bilateral FTAs as a tool of foreign policy.9 Similar to its inter-
ests in Egypt, the U.S. interests in these countries are much
more political than economic.200 Also, similar to Egypt, during
the negotiation of the respective FTAs, both countries were in
the process of implementing "internal economic reforms and try-
,,201ing to liberalize their economies. Such existing agreements
can provide valuable lessons and insights regarding what eco-
nomic impact can be expected from a U.S.-Egypt agreement and
194. Lawrence, supra note 95, at 72-73.
195. Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, Jordan FTA, http://www.ustr.gov/
TradeAgreements/Bilateral/Jordan/SectionIndex.html (last visited Jan. 27, 2006).
196. Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, Bahrain FTA Final Text,
http://www.ustr.gov/Trade-Agreements/Bilateral/Bahrain-FTA/final-texts/Section-I
ndex.html (last visited Jan. 27, 2006).
197. Immediately upon implementation of the agreement, "100 percent of con-
sumer and industrial products and 81 percent of U.S. agricultural exports [were]
duty free. Bahrain will open its services market wider than any previous FTA part-
ner, streamline digital trade, protect intellectual property, facilitate government
procurement, and provide for effective enforcement of labor and environmental
laws." Press Release, U.S. Trade Representative, United States and Bahrain Sign
Free Trade Agreement, (Sep. 14, 2004), http'//www.ustr.gov/DocumentLibrary/
PressReleases/2004/September/UnitedStatesBahrainSignFreeTrade_
Agreement.html.
198. Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, Bahrain FTA Final Text, supra
note 196.
199. Rosen, supra note 127, at 51.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 74.
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what such an agreement should include.
The U.S.-Jordan FTA, formalized in October 2000, was a
reward for Jordan's peace agreement with Israel in 1994.202 The
FTA provides an excellent example of the positive economic im-
pact that such agreements can yield, especially for Middle East-
ern trading partners.2 °3 In 1999, the United States imported $31
million in goods from Jordan.0 4 By 2004, U.S. imports from
Jordan were almost $1 billion.05 Similarly, U.S. exports to Jor-
dan during the same period nearly doubled from $270 million to
over $530 million. °6 This trade agreement between the United
States and Jordan has been "astoundingly effective" in stimulat-
ing trade.07 Jordan's dramatic increase in exports to the United
States "shows the latent potential for rapid expansion of trade
flows under FTAs .,, 2 °' There is no reason that an FTA with
Egypt could not yield similar, if not even more dramatic, eco-
nomic results given Egypt's larger and more diverse economy.
For the agreement to fit into an eventual FTA that encom-
passes the entire Middle East, it should fit with other agree-
ments the United States has conducted in the region, such as
the Jordanian and Bahrainian agreements. Bahrain especially,
being the most recent and most expansive agreement, can serve
as an effective template for a U.S.-Egypt agreement. Several of
the factors prevalent in concluding an agreement with Egypt
were present in both Jordan and Bahrain, including economic
considerations for the Middle Eastern countries and foreign pol-
icy objectives for the United States. Accordingly, substantial
groundwork has already been put in place for a potential U.S.-
Egypt agreement in the form of the existing agreements in the
region. While the U.S.-Israel agreement could also serve as a
model, it would not be an ideal choice because it is not very com-
prehensive. 0 9 Instead, the agreement with Israel should even-
tually be brought up to date to resemble the other U.S. bilateral
agreements in the Middle East, such as the U.S.-Bahrain
202. Nsour, supra note 91, at 743. Sidney Weintraub of the Center for Strategic
and International Studies said that the message being sent now by the U.S. Trade
Representative is that FTAs will depend heavily on support for American foreign
policy. Sidney Weintraub, The Politics of US Trade Policy, BBC NEWS, Sept. 3,
2003, http'J/news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/3169649.stm.
203. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
204. GALAL & LAWRENCE, ANCHORING REFORM, supra note 7, at 4.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Hilaire & Yang, supra note 72, at 606.
209. See supra notes 190-191 and accompanying discussion.
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agreement.
However, if possible, the restrictions on the textile industry
found within the Bahrain agreement should be removed. Tex-
tiles are Egypt's largest industry"'° and one of the main eco-
nomic forces driving Egypt into an agreement with the United
States.211 Egypt has been facing increased competition in the
textile market due to the WTO's lifting of quotas on textiles,2 2
and access to the U.S. market could provide a huge economic
boost to the Egyptian industry.
For the United States, the economic considerations in such
an agreement are secondary but not insignificant. A major eco-
nomic consideration for the United States involves furthering
the economy of Egypt so that the United States does not have to
213provide as much, if any, economic aid to the country. Given
Egypt's position as the second largest recipient of U.S. foreign
assistance, reforms that strengthen its economy would help the
United States wean the country off of the vast assistance, allow-
ing Egypt to focus on trade with the United States instead of
aid. 214 U.S. firms also have opportunities that arise from in-
creased access to foreign markets; as it has been noted, the Jor-
dan FTA helped U.S. exports to that country nearly double.
Those economic opportunities are most plentiful when accompa-
nied by meaningful institutional reforms that foster develop-
ment and foreign investment, as a broad U.S.-Egypt FTA would
if based upon other similar, recent agreements in the region.
Politically, Egypt would likely be more concerned than Jor-
dan or Bahrain as being seen as moving closer to the United
States. Both Jordan and Bahrain are constitutional monarchies
and have no pretense of being democratic. They therefore are
less susceptible politically to internal criticism, which is a par-
ticular concern for Egypt right now after the unexpectedly
strong showing of the Muslim Brotherhood, an Islamic party
that ran in opposition to Mubarak's government in the most re-
cent election.2"5 Also, Egypt's role in the Middle East makes it
more of a target than other Middle Eastern countries for criti-
210. CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, supra note 14.
211. Note, however, that because Bahrain's economy is based mostly upon petro-
leum, textiles are not a major industry in the country. CENT. INTELLIGENCE
AGENCY, THE WORLD FACTBOOK, BAHRAIN (2006),
http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/ba.html.
212. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
213. See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text.
214. See supra notes 19-20, 27 and accompanying text.
215. See Hamzawy & Brown, supra note 94, at 3-4, 8.
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cism of its foreign policies, both within its own borders and
within the region.216 However, Egypt has been able to make ges-
tures towards the West before while still maintaining its respect
and leadership role among countries in the Middle East.217 An
FTA would be an excellent vehicle for Egypt to deepen its eco-
nomic relationship with the United States while maintaining
political autonomy. For the United States, an agreement boost-
ing the economy of Egypt might help lend further stability to
this vital region, providing further international security and
leading to further democratization in the region. It would also
serve as a dramatic step forward towards the U.S. goal of secur-
ing a regional FTA in the Middle East. Securing a meaningful
regional agreement without including Egypt would be difficult,
if not impossible. Considering Egypt's formidable role in the
Middle East, it should be incorporated into the web of U.S. FTAs
as soon as possible to profit most from its inclusion, as other
countries would be likely to follow.
CONCLUSION
This Note has advocated an FTA between the United States
and Egypt. The foreign policy objectives of both countries pro-
vide ample reasons for them to align economically, while Egypt
has some reason to remain politically independent. An FTA is a
perfect vehicle for such objectives, further harmonizing eco-
nomically while maintaining political independence.
An effective framework has already been implemented with
other countries in the region and could be adapted to fit the
needs of Egypt very easily. Between the United States' recent
shift in trade policy to an emphasis on promulgating FTAs, its
foreign policy focus on securing the Middle East and spurring
reform in the region, and Egypt's stated desire and readiness to
embrace further economic reforms, the time to act is right now.
Otherwise, Egypt must either continue to rely heavily on U.S.
handouts or move closer to another region, possibly by expand-
ing its existing agreement with the European Union, and the
United States will either be forced to continue providing vast
amounts of aid or risk moving away from a valuable ally in a vi-
tal region.
216. See supra notes 21-22, 102 and accompanying discussion.
217. See supra note 66 and accompanying quotation (discussing Egypt's peace
agreement with Israel).
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